Ungraspable as a Philosophical Problem

The Ungraspable as a Philosophical Problem provides an analysis of the ungraspable-of that which cannot be grasped by the mind or the senses. When referring to the ungraspable in sensible reality, we often speak of the 'untouchable,' the 'invisible,' the 'inaudible,' and the 'untastable.' In the abstract realm, we speak of the 'non-conceptual,' the 'ineffable,' the 'unsayable.' These are the modalities of the ungraspable that are explored in this study. They have been considered absolute by some thinkers, a claim that I critically assess. My central claim is that the absoluteness of these modalities is linked to a desire to grasp, which is characterized by the desire for exactitude, for the proper, and for domination. First, I examine the role of the hand in phenomenology, more precisely in Martin Heidegger's philosophy, in order to further define the notion of the ungraspable. I then analyze Emmanuel Levinas's early works, which offer an account of the ungraspability of nature (the there is). I then turn to Jacques Derrida, who has proved that otherness is not only human but also animal and theoretical, but who devotes little space to the otherness of the more-than-human, or inorganic objects. Finally, I examine the otherness of so-called inorganic or more-than-living objects (natural objects and artifacts), demonstrating its importance to our current situation.