The Iraq War

The Iraq War has been the subject of heated

political debate and intense academic scrutiny. Much

argument has focused on the decision to invade and

the size of the force tasked with the campaign. While

these factors have contributed to the challenge of

counterinsurgency operations, so has the American

approach to unconventional war.

Taking full account of the factors beyond the control

of the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisons

with Vietnam, this monograph examines how the

American approach has affected operations. The

author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, draws on the experience

of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to

identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct

of this and future campaigns. He also documents the

process by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq have

adapted to the challenging situation and incorporated

both historic and contemporary lessons into the new

counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual

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