The Impossible Mission

Our decision to go to war in Iraq was controversial, but our decision to terminate the Iraq war should have been even more controversial.

After eight-and-a half years of war, and the sacrifice of 4,614 Americans, it is critical that we as a Nation understand how this war terminated, and study the lessons learned so that we do not have to re-learn it all over again in the next war. This book is about the 2011 drawdown in Iraq which created numerous unintended consequences that failed to line up to our strategic objectives of what we wanted to leave behind, and what Iraq would become as an important partner nation within the middle east region.

This book will walk you through the sequence of events from 9/11, which include the decision to go to war in Iraq, the surge in northern Iraq, President Obama's decision to withdraw, the original plans for a residual force, the departure of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the circumstances of the immediate aftermath, and the significant strategy changes of the Department of State. It will detail what occurred from not only the U.S. Embassy's perspective, but also from each of our government's departments and agencies, as well as from multiple Iraqi perspectives. It will show how the polarization of the Sunnis and the Kurds by Prime Minister Malaki immediately after the U.S. withdrawal led to the disenfranchised Sunni's who provided safe-haven for a resurrected radical Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which created a caliphate that ultimately led to the return of U.S. forces working with the Iraqi military to defeat ISIS and their caliphate. It studies the Kurd and Arab issues over time and OSC-I's efforts to continue to resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation. It also highlights Iranian influence on key Iraqi leadership, as well as its impact on the OSC-I mission.

This is a book scholars and military professionals should study. It is a book that our legislative elected officials will want to read, to understand the privileges and authorities that must be legislated for successful transitions out of war. And it is a book interagency partners and national security authorities should study to understand the interagency teamwork necessary to transition U.S. government departments, from war, to war termination.