Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy, Wittgenstein and the Concept of Mind

Taking their departure from a careful consideration of how we use ordinary words in everyday life, the Oxford philosophers Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin, and their followers spearheaded an anti-cognitivist revolution in the philosophy of mind by arguing that psychological expressions do not describe internal mental states, acts, processes, or objects but instead play a purely logical role. They soon encountered sophisticated resistance from Peter Geach, Paul Grice, Susan Haack, and other philosophers sympathetic to cognitivism. This historically informed and analytically rigorous study provides a detailed overview of the Oxford anti-cognitivist critique, reconstructs the cognitivist objections to it, and shows how interaction between Oxford ordinary language philosophy and Wittgenstein's later writings overcomes these objections while clarifying obscure aspects of Wittgenstein's perspective. The book will appeal to scholars and students of philosophy, historians interested in the development of 20th-century thought, and anyone fascinated by the relation between language and the mind.