Let Slip the Dogs of (Cyber) War

Since late 2009, most offensive cyber capabilities have been unavailable to the Joint Force Commander. Outside of the boundaries of a theater of war, offensive cyber activities are limited to those in response to Presidential direction only. This limitation is a result of competing interests within the U.S. Government for control of cyberspace as an operational domain. The competition is currently being played out through an artificial legal debate over authorities and terminology. To remove some of the subjectivity associated with the debate over cyberspace control, the author first engages in a plain language review of Congressional oversight pertaining to covert actions versus military special operations. Given the current attempts to apply this construct to cyberspace, what follows is analysis and explanation of why this approach is inappropriate for cyberspace as a domain of war. Finally, the author provides recommendations to enable a fully functional U.S. Cyber Command through executive policy, legislation, and extensive education and training for the Department of Defense workforce on cyberspace. In doing so, offensive cyber capabilities will once again be available for incorporation within campaign and contingency plans in support of the assigned mission.