Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger

This book reassesses the phenomenological 'controversy' between Husserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It seeks to determine whether Heidegger's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its 'Sachen selbst'. Hopkins argues that Heidegger's critique is directed toward the 'cogito' modality of intentionality, and therefore, passes over its 'non-actional', or 'horizonal', dimension in Husserl's phenomenology. As a result of this, he concludes that Heidegger misinterprets Husserl's account of the intentional 'immanence' exhibited by phenomenological reflection. On the basis of these findings, Hopkins suggests that the phenomenological methodology, operative in the so-called hermeneutic critique of transcendental consciousness, itself involves transcendental 'presuppositions' that are most appropriately characterized in terms of intentional, and reflective, phenomena.